A major review of public administration in Northern Ireland has resulted in proposals for radical reforms in health, education, and local government services. Although originating from the devolved government of 1999, intermittent suspensions resulted in Direct Rule Ministers taking over responsibility for the review. This article traces the influence of a sizeable body of research evidence on the outcomes of the review, specifically controversial reforms to local government, and the significant influence attached to macro political factors in reaching key public policy decisions. It also highlights the asymmetry in power relations between Stormont and local government and how devolution has simply compounded regional centralism in Northern Ireland.
Introduction
Northern Ireland has witnessed its most significant political development for decades. been, for centuries, the most intractable source of political conflict in Europe' (Hain, 2007: 1) . Witnessing the key protagonists, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin, going into government together, argued Hain, 'makes 'historic' seem like a cliché'. Even allowing for the media hyperbole associated with the occasion, Northern
Ireland has entered a new era of political accommodation with huge expectations for 'normal' as opposed to the zero-sum politics of the last 30-odd years. Not surprisingly a backlog of public policy issues awaited the new Executive, key amongst which were: a review of the selective system of secondary level education, the proposed introduction of water charges, and public sector reform.
Since the prorogation of Stormont in 1972, acute political, constitutional and security issues have, for obvious reasons, consumed ministerial energies and the task of running their departments has, by default, been left to senior civil servants. Under 'direct rule', British Ministers had no electoral base in Northern Ireland removing any explicit political accountability. These circumstances conferred a special status on officials who wielded virtually unfettered power and controlled significant public resources .
Whilst 'normal' mechanisms of public accountability applied (the fairly remote prospect of appearing in front of Westminster's Public Accounts Committee), Northern Ireland governance was accorded a much lower priority than macro political issues. Given the context of a unique set of political arrangements, by comparison with other parts of the United Kingdom, this paper attempts to do three things. First, it will consider the policy making process in Northern Ireland in the absence of direct ministerial involvement and the influences thereon. Second, using a case study of local government, it will consider whether Northern Ireland has embraced the move towards evidence based policy making heralded by the Labour Government in the rest of the United Kingdom. Third, it will consider the extent to which devolution in Northern Ireland impacts on regional centralism which has characterised central-local government relations since the early 1970s.
Policy Making in Northern Ireland
But for the short interludes when Northern Ireland had devolved government, policy making has been in the hands of a small civil service élite since 1972. Civil servants, of course, contend that they did not seek such a monopoly on the decision making process but by force of circumstances, visiting ministers were so pre-occupied with more important security matters, public policy matters were left to them. As one observer of the direct rule period put it:
The concern now expressed more frequently than in the past is that the operational impact of the present political circumstances means that senior civil servants are placed in positions of greater influence, either by the effects of direct rule which reduce the involvement of ministers (who cannot be readily available) or the acceptance by senior officials of a higher profile in public (Simpson, 1997: 4) .
Given the powerful role assumed by civil servants, it is no surprise that some found it difficult to adjust to the accountability demands placed on them by the return of devolved government in December 1999 (albeit for intermittent periods thereafter The reality of policy making/delivery was described (by civil servants) as messy and unpredictable. Importantly, there was a clear understanding that evidence is just one factor to be taken into consideration alongside other factors such as the political imperative and response to media and world events (Campbell, Benita, Coates, Davies and Penn, 2007: 6) .
The Social Research Unit makes reference to non-research factors which also influence policy and includes the role played by Ministers in reaching policy decisions. Some ministers, they reported, routinely ask for evidence from their officials, others were less concerned with an evidence base, or as one of the interviewees in their research put it 'there is a political context to almost everything we do… There are often political commitments that lead you in directions that the evidence doesn't necessarily strongly support' (Campbell et al, 2007: 14) .
So strong is the political influence that Hope (2006) sees a basic 'incompatibility between the ideology of evidence-based policy and the natural inclination of the political process to want to secure the best outcomes' for itself (quoted in Grayson, 2006: 397) . Burton has argued that the 'utilisation of research-based knowledge is driven as much by political expediency and broader social and political factors as it is by standards of objective truth and epistemological certainty' (Burton, 2006: 191) . He suggests policy researchers need to become more politically savvy as well as technically skilled if they are to have influence. Similarly Parsons recognises 'that 'facts' are embedded in the world of values and politics and competing frames' whereas 'evidence based policy making wishes to extricate them from the political/value quagmire' (Parsons, 2002: 58) . He endorses Schön's idea that government should facilitate reflective organisations to self-transform, in contrast to the modernising agenda which is predicated on strategic steering where 'prediction and control is so difficult and 'evidence' is so problematic' (Parsons, 2002: 51) . Beyond the influence of politics, Davies (2004) , drawing on the work of Nutley, Walter and Davies (2003) , highlights the experience, expertise and judgement of decision makers as important influences on policy making, particularly in situations where evidence is equivocal, imperfect or non-existent. Given the powerful role exerted by civil servants in Northern Ireland and the absence of a UK modernising agenda, was there an evidence based approach to public policy making?
The Review of Public Administration
To try and understand the policy making process in Northern Ireland we examine in some detail how the (then) British Secretary of State, Peter Hain, and his ministers reached key decisions on a major public administration reform programme. In one of its earlier incarnations, the Northern Ireland Assembly decided that a pressing priority was to reform and modernise its public services. The Northern Ireland reform agenda has three main foci: investing in the infrastructure needed to deliver public services; improving public services; and a Review of Public Administration which looked at who provided services, the way they were provided, and how effectively they met the needs of the citizen (Northern Ireland Executive, 2002) . At the outset, the (then) First Minister argued that the Review of Public Administration was one of the major tasks facing the Northern Ireland Executive and presented 'an opportunity of a generation to put in place a modern, accountable, effective system of public administration that can deliver a high quality set of public services to our citizens' (Trimble, 2002:371) . Years of neglect and short term political 'solutions' had left the administrative landscape of public services in Northern
Ireland complex and bureaucratically cumbersome. Northern Ireland was both overgoverned and over-administered, in part as a result of political intransigence and poor governance . With 3 MEPs, 18 MPs, 108 MLAs and 582 councillors, all for a population of 1.7 million people, it is hardly surprising that outside observers were bewildered by the extent of political representation yet little or no political progress (until recently). Equally, 11 government departments, 18 executive agencies, 5 health and social services boards, 4 education and library boards, 18 health trusts, 26 local authorities and over 100 non-departmental public bodies could only prompt the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee in Westminster to complain that 'we found again and again that the quality of governance in Northern Ireland has been below par compared to the rest of the United Kingdom' (Leigh, 2006: 253) .  Local councils will be reduced from 26 to 7. The boundaries of the new councils were decided through an Independent Boundary Commissioner and are largely based on groupings of existing councils.  The new councils will have an increased range of powers.  Councils will have legal powers to lead a community planning process, and there will be a statutory duty on other agencies to work with the councils. In addition, councils will also have the power of 'well-being'.  The number of councillors will be reduced from 582 councillors to 420 (7 councils by 60 councillors).
 A system of statutory checks and balances will be developed to ensure there is fair and transparent decision-making within the new councils.  A new system of local government finance will be developed.
The proposed timescale for implementation of the above reforms is that elections were to be held to new shadow councils in 2008 which would become fully operational in spring 2009 (a timetable now abandoned).
Did the evidence support these reforms? The most controversial decision reached by the Review was to reduce the number of councils from 26 to 7. We consider three key elements of data gathering most relevant to the determination of the final number of councils -survey evidence, public consultation and stakeholder views. Two additional and detailed research exercises were commissioned by the Review Team to: (a) produce various council groupings which would provide for an even tax base across Northern Ireland and (b) GIS-generated administrative zones based on compactness, travel to work and population, not exceeding 300,000 (McCluskey et al, 2004; Lloyd, 2005) . The former concluded that 'splitting the province into a few large areas is unlikely to produce an even tax base under either the existing or proposed rating systems' (McCluskey et al, 2004: 26) . The latter claimed that 'no single set of zones is clearly 'optimal' and the most sensible approach is to detail several sets of zones which can be considered in light of other (additional) criteria' (Lloyd, 2005: 12) .
During public consultation on the changes, three options were offered: 7, 11 or 15 councils. The (then) Minister responsible, Lord Rooker, in announcing the Government's 'final' decisions on local government reform stated:
This morning the Secretary of State (Peter Hain) announced that all of the evidence -and I stress evidence -not opinion or speculation, pointed to seven councils as the optimum model for local government in Northern Ireland. This was a view shared by almost two-thirds of respondents to the consultation who expressed a preference (Rooker, 2005a) . This statement provided the rationale for selecting the 7 council model. We consider the various sources of evidence in some detail. One of the questions posed in the survey was:
In terms of the Review's proposal to reduce the number of councils to either 7, 11 or 15, do you have a preference?
The survey findings are set out in table 1 and figure 1. The data show that Lord Rooker based his decision to reduce the number of councils to seven on the views of 70 self-selected consultees responding to the Review's further consultation document. He 'spun' the announcement by referring to evidence supporting the 7-council model from 'almost two-thirds of respondents to the consultation who expressed a preference' (in essence 70 consultees from 113). Lord Rooker failed to mention the survey data based on a random sample of people throughout Northern Ireland (data which can be extrapolated to the overall population within confidence 3 The Further Consultation document secured 1032 responses but was used in a concerted campaign by the education sector to lobby around two specific reform issues -the future of: the Catholic Council for Maintained Schools (CCMS), and the youth services. Extracting the campaign-related responses (n=589) resulted in 443 'usable' replies to the consultation. 4 These figures discount the 'no preference' and 'others' from the survey data to make it comparable with the public consultation data. Hanson), when challenged to explain this anomaly defended his decision by claiming that respondents to the consultation paper were 'able to take a much more considered view of the issues' and, by implication, the views of a randomly selected sample of the population of Northern Ireland should be ignored -as they were (Hanson, 2007: 10) . Whilst attaching weight to the opinions of some consultees, the Minister, on the other hand, chose to reject the views of key stakeholders in the local government debate, in particular the political parties. We now consider the views of the key stakeholders. One of the key functions of councils will be to foster good community relations. The development of strong local government in Northern Ireland is a 'lightening rod' for a shared future. In future councils will ensure that good relations are earthed in the needs of local communities (Rooker, 2005b) .
In fact, the proposed amalgamation of existing councils into the seven 'super councils' will accentuate community divisions as table 3 (see map 1) illustrates. The first tier is a regional tier encompassing the Assembly, government departments, and regional authorities, the focus of which is policy development, setting standards and delivering regional services. The second tier, a sub-regional tier, encompasses organisations that operate within common boundaries to include councils, health bodies, sub-regional bodies and delivery units of regional bodies. The model assumed delivery at the sub-regional tier unless economies of scale (or other factors) dictated delivery on a regional basis. The results from the survey are set out in table 4. The Northern Ireland departments have already evaded inspection under the Review of Public Administration. To my mind, that was quite wrong -I never understood how a comprehensive review of public administration could be carried out in Northern Ireland which excluded civil service departments and confined itself only to councils and health and education boards. Many people in the councils and boards feel very aggrieved that they should be subject to a major review, facing a very uncertain job future, while the civil servants in the departments get off scot-free (Bell, 2005:1) .
There is however substantial evidence of the need for reforms to both the structure and effectiveness of central government departments in Northern Ireland. Parry's work (2003) on the issues facing the civil service in Scotland under devolution is equally significant in Northern Ireland. He described four challenges facing Scottish civil servants: how they present themselves and relate to others; how they configure and operate the administrative machine; how they see themselves relating to the traditions of the Civil Service; and how they equip themselves to advise ministers on policy development. Former Minister Lord Rooker, for example, described the structure of 11 NI departments as 'absolutely bamy'. During his time as a direct rule minister in Northern Ireland with line responsibility for four departments he said, 'let's face it, the structure of 11 departments is illogical. Every week I find I am responsible for something new. The structure was created after the Good Friday Agreement to ensure there were enough ministerial portfolios to share between parties' (Rooker, 2005c:1) . Yet performance by civil service departments has attracted severe criticism from
Westminster's Public Accounts Committee. One member noted 'I am worried that Northern Ireland's citizens and taxpayers may not be receiving the service we expect to see in the rest of the United Kingdom. The overall message must be, in all the areas that we have looked at, there is enormous scope to improve' (Bacon, 2006: 11) . The Government has constantly blocked debate on the Review of Public Administration issue because the decision to support a seven-council model is one of the least justifiable of their many bad recent decisions. It has the least merit, is the most politically driven and has been produced for the wrong reasons. It is particularly appalling that the Government has used the issues of reform of public administration and the number of councils as devices in its wider schemes for political progress in Northern Ireland (Weir, 2006b ).
Conclusions
As a result of this debate, the transitional Assembly expressed serious disquiet about the potential of a 7 council model to centralise services, remove jobs and resources from many areas, and to underpin sectarianism and community division; and called on the The reforms arising from the Review of Public Administration were described as 'a vision of change that represents the greatest single challenge to the public sector in
Northern Ireland for over 30 years' (Hain, 2005: 14) . From our analysis it is clear that key empirical evidence in reaching decisions on the potential reform package was ignored. Should we be surprised by this ? Young, Ashby, Boaz and Grayson (2002) contrast the ideal type policy process and the realities of policy making in the following way. In the former, 'information is supplied which is objective, and possibly conclusive, reducing uncertainties about the relationship between policies and outcomes'. In the latter, 'decisions are less about projected consequences and more about process and legitimation. Politics is about shaping interpretations and expressing preferences' (Young et al, 2002: 218) . In fact, the Northern Ireland case study is a good example of Young et al's 'political/tactical' model in which policy is an outcome of the wider political process (in this case, forcing local politicians to share power). Their warning (Young et al, 2002: 217) that 'in extreme cases the research/researcher can become vulnerable to political attack' transpired. Minister Hanson, somewhat ironically, attacked the evidence presented by this author as being 'selective in the information chosen' and 'not providing alternative research in support of another council model' (Hanson, 2007:10) .
The Review of Public Administration accumulated a significant body of evidence to support the final decisions arrived at by the Secretary of State. Expecting the outcomes to be causally linked to the evidence is to ignore the messy realities of the decision making process in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. Civil servants, with their monopoly on power, and largely unaffected by the wider UK modernising agenda which promoted the primacy of evidence based policy making, drove the reform agenda. A hand-picked team of officials conducted the review of public administration and, by design, the process excluded government departments. In 'normal' direct rule circumstances the will of senior civil servants would have prevailed. But a bigger political prize was at stake.
Direct rule ministers sought to provoke locally elected representatives and their political parties into agreeing to devolution by deliberately opposing their views on the reforms of local government. Local government reform in Northern Ireland is perhaps an unintended example of the kind of process referred to by Parsons (2002: 56) who, drawing on the work of Lasswell, argued that the aim of policy sciences is to contribute to the democratisation of the policy making process, in contrast to an evidence based approach which seeks 'to de-politicise and managerialise knowledge production and its utilisation'.
With  The number of councils in Northern Ireland will now be rationalised from 26 to 11.  Additional functions of the new councils will include: local development plans; local public realm aspects of roads; urban regeneration and community development; housing-related functions; local economic development; and local tourism, arts, sports and leisure.  An independent Local Government Boundaries Commissioner was appointed (for the second time) to redraw 11 new council boundaries.  A local government modernisation process will be supported by the Department of the Environment.  The timeline for reorganised local government will now be elections to the new councils in 2011.
The new functions will require a 25% increase in council budgets and 12% increase in council staffing. This suggests an annual (new) council expenditure of around £575m out of a total devolved budget of around £8 billion -just over 7% of the public purse. parties are keen to demonstrate their ministerial credentials, has compounded these centripetal tendencies. Regional centralism and limited local government best characterise Northern Ireland's governance arrangements now and in the future.
